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The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is a popular measure of individual differences in
Theory of Mind that is often applied in the assessment of particular clinical populations
(primarily, individuals on the autism spectrum). However, little is known about the
test’s psychometric properties, including factor structure, internal consistency, and
convergent validity evidence. We present a psychometric analysis of the test followed
by an evaluation of other empirically proposed and statistically identified structures. We
identified, and cross-validated in a second sample, an adequate short-form solution
that is homogeneous with adequate internal consistency, and is moderately related
to Cognitive Empathy, Emotion Perception, and strongly related to Vocabulary. We
recommend the use of this short-form solution in normal adults as a more precise
measure over the original version. Future revisions of the test should seek to reduce
the test’s reliance on one’s vocabulary and evaluate the short-form structure in clinical
populations.
Keywords: reading the mind in the eyes test, theory of mind, psychometric analysis, emotion perception,
vocabulary, cognitive empathy, short-form
Introduction
“Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” – Groucho Marx
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is a popular measure of individual differences in Theory
of Mind capabilities (ToM; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The test distinguishes many clinical
populations (most often individuals on the autistic spectrum) from unimpaired control participants
in their ToM capabilities. Despite widespread use of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
(hereafter referred to as the Eyes Test, according to a convention established by its authors), little
is known about the test’s psychometric properties, including the test’s factor structure, internal
consistency, convergent validity evidence, and the extent to which the measure operates as an
effective individual difference measure in normal adults (where it has become increasingly used,
e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2005). In addition, with the widespread use of this measure in clinical
settings, where testing time is always limited, the creation of a short-form version would appear
desirable.
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In this paper, we present a psychometric analysis of the Eyes
Test. First, we present a discussion of ToM and how the Eyes
Test was designed to measure this construct, followed by a review
of existing estimates of the test’s psychometric properties. Then,
we present a psychometric evaluation of the complete Eyes Test,
followed by an evaluation of other proposed structures (e.g.,
positive and negative affect subscales). Next, using data driven
methods, we attempt to identify possible short-form variants
that either maintain or are an improvement over the Eyes Test
on particular psychometric parameters. All solutions that show
adequate psychometric properties are then related at the latent
level with measures of Cognitive Empathy, Emotion Perception,
and Vocabulary to estimate the test’s convergent validity. All
solutions that meet our psychometric criteria are then cross-
validated in a second sample. Finally, based on our results, we
discuss suggested revisions to the measure.
Theory of Mind
ToM refers to the ability to infer the mental states of others,
including intention and knowledge. ToM is referred to as a
theory because the inferred mental states (i.e., the mind) are not
directly observable and instead one must generate a theory with
predictions about how others will behave. ToM was originally
developed to describe behavior by chimpanzees (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978), and was subsequently extended to describe the
development of children in their ability to take the perspective
of another person (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001). Thereafter, ToM
has been applied to describe social and communicative deficits
in specific clinical populations, most commonly individuals on
the autism spectrum (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). ToM is
often considered to be conceptually similar to, or equivalent with,
cognitive empathy because both constructs involve inferring the
mental state of another person (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2004).
While ToM is typically considered a single, general construct,
others have described ToM as representing a multifaceted
construct that takes “into account an interconnected network
of mental states,” which are described as “perception, attention,
belief, desire, intention, emotion, and more” (Astington, 2003,
p. 14). As such, Slaughter and Repacholi (2003) argue that if ToM
is multifaceted, tests of ToM should also be multifaceted. For
example, ToM ability might differ depending on the modality
of expression (e.g., voice, face, body) or on actions in that
modality (e.g., static representation, moving representation).
However, often-used tests of ToM are not deemed multifaceted
or multidimensional by their authors, including the Eyes Test
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
ToM is theorized to rely heavily on the gaze direction of the
person being observed (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), which is
considered important for social communication and interaction
(e.g., Emery, 2000). Many suggest that there is an innate evolved
neural system devoted to processing the eye gaze of others; this is
supported by experimental research with infants demonstrating
that infants as young as several hours old prefer faces with open
eyes (Batki et al., 2000). Moreover, research with adults suggests
that this population has difficulty ignoring the eye gaze of others
(Posner, 1980), with functional imaging research suggesting that
the posterior superior temporal sulcus and areas of the medial
frontal cortex are involved in both eye gaze and ToM tasks
(Calder et al., 2002).
Along this line, ToM is related to the ability to perceive
emotions expressed in the face. In particular, the Eyes Test has
been shown to be moderately to strongly related with measures
of emotion perception ability (Henry et al., 2009; Petroni et al.,
2011). Indeed, in some cases the Eyes Test has been used as a
measure of emotion perception (e.g., Guastella et al., 2010).
ToM is also associated with language ability. Research suggests
there is a developmental threshold around a particular level
of language development, and before this threshold, children
cannot successfully “pass” any ToM measure (Jenkins and
Astington, 1996). For example, one longitudinal study found that,
when controlling for earlier ToM performance, language ability
(syntax and semantics) predicted current ToM, but earlier ToM
did not predict current language abilities (Astington and Jenkins,
1999). As a result, some researchers have suggested that it is
specific aspects of verbal ability that predict performance on ToM
measures (Lawrence et al., 2004; Peterson and Miller, 2012). In
general, verbal abilities are associated with performance on the
Eyes Test (Golan et al., 2006; Ahmed and Miller, 2011; Peterson
and Miller, 2012; cf. Ferguson and Austin, 2010 who found no
relation).
Psychometric Evaluation of the Eyes Test
The Eyes Test was designed to measure the first stage of ToM
attribution, which is identifying the relevant mental state of the
stimulus (as opposed to the second stage; inferring the content
of that mental state; see Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Accordingly,
the Eyes Test was developed under the premise that ToM is
heavily based on the perception of eye gaze in others. The current
assessment (i.e., Version 2) includes 36 items where participants
view the eyes of a person andmust select which of four terms best
describes the intention of a target person. Of note, this version of
the Eyes Test is considered superior to earlier versions, largely on
the grounds of reliability and validity evidence (see Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001). The Eyes Test has been translated into a variety of
languages including: Bosnian (Schmidt and Zachariae, 2009),
French (Prevost et al., 2014), Greek (child version; Vogindroukas
et al., 2014), Italian (Vellante et al., 2012), Japanese (Kunihira
et al., 2006; Adams et al., 2009), Persian (Khorashad et al., 2015),
Romanian (Miu et al., 2012), Spanish (Fernández-Abascal et al.,
2013), Swedish (Hallerbäck et al., 2009), and Turkish (Girli,
2014).
Reliability
Based on published estimates, the Eyes Test typically has poor
internal consistency (Voracek and Dressler, 2006; Harkness
et al., 2010; Ragsdale and Foley, 2011; Vellante et al., 2012;
Khorashad et al., 2015; cf. Dehning et al., 2012; Girli, 2014;
Prevost et al., 2014, for an exception). The Eyes Test also does
not meet assumptions of normality (Söderstrand and Almkvist,
2012; Vellante et al., 2012). However, the test-retest reliability
of the measure is acceptable (Hallerbäck et al., 2009; Yildirim
et al., 2011; Vellante et al., 2012; Prevost et al., 2014; Khorashad
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et al., 2015). The low internal consistency estimates may be a
function of various test attributes. For example, there are many
inconsistencies between the items (e.g., commonness of response
option words, uneven presentation of identities, angle of face),
whichmay reduce the internal consistency of the test. In addition,
there is limited standardization of the picture characteristics
(e.g., ratio of dark and light, use of shadows, artifacts present),
which may be a confound. To this end, Hallerbäck et al. (2009)
found that changing the lighting of one image increased the
performance on that item.
It seems plausible that the low internal consistency occurs
because the test does not have a single factor solution, but instead
measures several factors. While the Eyes Test is proposed to
measure a single construct (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), as noted
previously others have suggested that there might be subscales
composed of those items that represent positive, negative, and
neutral affect (Harkness et al., 2005;Maurage et al., 2011; Konrath
et al., 2014). However, the results of a confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) suggest that the division of items into an affect specific
factor is a poor fit to the data (Vellante et al., 2012). Whether this
result is replicable across various populations remains uncertain.
In summary, available research with the Eyes Test suggests
that in general, the test has poor internal consistency and there
is limited evidence of the test’s homogeneity. This study will
re-examine these assertions based on two samples of Amazon
Mechanical Turk workers, who appear more representative of
the general population than are the typical first year psychology
students comprising many of the studies reviewed in the
preceding (see e.g., Berinsky et al., 2012).
Validity Evidence
The results of several studies suggest that the Eyes Test scores
show convergent validity evidence with other ToM measures,
specifically scores from the Strange Stories Test and the Faux Pas
Test (Torralva et al., 2009; Ferguson and Austin, 2010; Kirkland
et al., 2012a), however, others have found no relation (Ahmed
and Miller, 2011; Duval et al., 2011). Likewise, the relation
between the Eyes Test and self-report measures of Cognitive
Empathy is mixed; the test has been shown to be both weakly
negatively related (Spreng et al., 2009) and weakly positively
related to self-reported cognitive empathy (Grove et al., 2014).
However, the test can successfully differentiate between
groups presumed to differ in their ToM abilities, specifically
between groups with and without autism or Asperger’s syndrome
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, 1997). In addition, researchers
have found schizophrenic patients (Bora et al., 2009) and
alcoholics (Maurage et al., 2011) perform worse on the Eyes Test
compared to controls.
The Current Studies: Rationale
Despite its widespread use, little is known about the psychometric
properties of the Eyes Test. Several studies identified the test as
having poor internal consistency and some have proposed that
the test is not unidimensional but instead measures multiple
factors. Given that this test is frequently applied in clinical
settings, the poor internal consistency in particular is troubling,
because it suggests it is unclear what exactly is being measured by
the current version of the test. A reduced scale would be beneficial
for the assessment field because it would be quicker to administer
and if the steps taken to shorten the measure focus on increasing
the test’s homogeneity, the short-form version would also be a
more precise measure of ToM.
The purpose of the current study was to perform a rigorous
psychometric evaluation of the Eyes Test. First, we test the
adequacy of the original version - a single-factor solution
including all items—and assess the extent to which the test is
internally consistent (i.e., all items are related to one another)
and homogenous (i.e., unidimensional with the items measuring
a single latent trait; Clark and Watson, 1995). In addition,
we test various short-form versions and subscales proposed in
the literature, followed by the application of two data driven
methods with the goal of identifying a short-form solution, while
simultaneously improving the test’s precision.
Each test version (i.e., the full scale, short-form solutions,
individual subscales) will be evaluated on the extent to which that
test version satisfies two psychometric criteria: (1) measurement
model fit, including adequate factor loadings, in a CFA; (2)
adequate omega estimate, which is based on the results of the CFA
and indicates the test’s factor saturation or “the reliability of a test
score . . . the precision with which a homogeneous test measures
the common attribute of its items” (McDonald, 1999, p. 90). We
chose these two tools, instead of traditional measures of internal
consistency (i.e., Cronbach’s Alpha [Cronbach, 1951] or KR-20
for dichotomous data [Kuder and Richardson, 1937]) because
unlike traditional estimates which do not assess homogeneity
(Cortina, 1993; Clark and Watson, 1995), omega and CFA,
simultaneously provide estimates of both. Also, Cronbach’s alpha
is highly biased by long tests; Cortina (1993) recommended
Cronbach’s alpha not be used for tests with more than 40 items
and the Eyes Test, at 36 items, is close to this limit.
Those scale solutions that meet both of our psychometric
criteria will be correlated at the latent-level with measures of
Emotion Perception, Cognitive Empathy, and Vocabulary. Given
previous research reviewed above, we expect moderate relations
with all three constructs. Finally, we will cross-validate those scale
solutions that adequately meet our criteria in a second sample.
Study 1
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk,
an online survey website and provided $8.00 for participating.
We chose Mechanical Turk because research suggests this
platform can be used to obtain data from a diverse sample and the
data is comparable to samples collected with traditional methods
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013). Initially, 616
individuals participated; 127 were removed because they failed
to correctly respond to at least one attention check questions
(an admittedly strict criteria, designed to ensure compliant
respondents). An additional three people were removed because
there was no variance in their response across an entire scale
(i.e., the person consistently selected the same response). Finally,
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we identified two outliers in the Eyes Test, where participants
performed substantially worse than the rest of the sample. When
those two persons were removed, the Eyes Test composite scores
were more normally distributed, so these two persons were
removed for the remainder of the analyses. Our final sample
consisted of 484 participants (243 female), 33.4 years of age
(SD = 11.0), primarily White, non-Hispanic (76%; 7% Black,
non-Hispanic; 8% Asian; 9% Other), from a variety of education
levels (13% High School or GED equivalent, 44% Some College,
43% Bachelors Degree or higher). All participants were currently
living in America (indicated by their IP addresses), with 95%
born in America, and for 96% their native language was English.
Measures
Participants completed several measures online (measures
presented at http://www.unipark.de/); as part of a larger study
examining various measures of cross-cultural competence,
inclusive of predictors, moderators, and mediators. In the
passages that follow, we only discuss those measures considered
relevant to our proposed research questions.
Reading the mind in the eyes
The Eyes Test is a 36-item measure originally developed to
measure ToM in adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The current
version (Version 2) uses four response options consisting of the
correct target word and three incorrect foil words. Each item is
scored as correct or incorrect.
Perspective taking
The Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (Davis, 1980) is a 7-item questionnaire that is considered
a measure of Cognitive Empathy. An example item is “I try
to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make
a decision” and the response options range from 1 “Does not
describe my well” to 5 “Describes me well.” In our sample, the
factor saturation was excellent (ω = 0.93).
Emotion specific empathy cognitive empathy
The Cognitive Empathy subscale of the Emotion Specific
Empathy questionnaire (ESE; Olderbak et al., 2014) is a 30-item
measure that assesses Cognitive Empathy. An example item is
“It is easy for me to understand why others become sad when
something heartbreaking happens to them” and the response
options range from−3 “Strongly Disagree” to 3 “Strongly Agree.”
In our sample, factor saturation for the Cognitive Empathy
subscale was excellent (ω = 0.95)
Diagnostic analysis of non-verbal accuracy version
2 – faces (DANVA 2)
The DANVA 2 Faces subscale (Nowicki and Duke, 1994) is a 24-
item measure that assesses the ability to perceive emotions in the
face. The test presents emotional faces with limited presentation
time, four response options (happy, sad, angry, fearful), and is
scored as correct or incorrect. Factor saturation was excellent
(ω = 0.93).
Vocabulary
This is a 4-choice synonym vocabulary test consisting of 18
items developed by the Educational Testing Service and items are
scored as correct or incorrect (Ekstrom et al., 1976). Each item
presents a target word (e.g., handicraft) and participants must
select among the response options best describes the target word
(e.g., cunning, fast boat, utility, manual skill, and guild). Factor
saturation was acceptable (ω = 0.79).
Procedure
Each person was tested online, un-proctored as a part of a larger
study examining cross cultural competence. At the end of the
testing sessions, participants were reimbursed for their time. All
tests and protocols were approved by the Educational Testing
Service Human Ethics and Fairness Review Committee.
Results
Because the data are dichotomous items indicative of a latent
trait, we chose to work with a tetrachoric correlation matrix
(estimated with PROC FREQ in SAS 9.3).
Full Scale Eyes Test Analysis
Descriptive statistics
The data were normally distributed (skew = −0.51; kurtosis =
−0.06) with participants, on average, receiving high scores (M =
27.20, SD = 3.82, Average percent correct = 76%), with
individual level scores ranging from 16 (44% correct) to 36 (100%
correct). With the exception of item 17, the most frequently
chosen response option was the correct response option (see
Table A1 in Supplementary Materials), which is supported by
prior studies of normal populations (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001; Harkness et al., 2005). The sample-level scores are similar
to other studies with participants on average correctly answered
over half of the items (e.g., in Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) the
sample-level scores for normal populations were high, ranging
from 26.2 to 30.9 [74–86% correct] and for individuals with
Asperger’s syndrome or High Functioning Autism the average
score was lower at 21.9 [61% correct]).
There was no relation between the Eyes Test and age (r =
0.08, p = 0.07) or education [F(4,479) = 1.22, p = 0.30
1 ;
see Söderstrand and Almkvist (2012), for similar results with
education]. Theory suggests females are higher in empathy than
males (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005) and thus will perform better
on the Eyes Test; however, this was also not supported in
our study [t(481) = 1.29, p = 0.20
2, see Kirkland et al.,
2012b; Vellante et al., 2012; but cf. Söderstrand and Almkvist,
2012].
Inter-item correlations
The tetrachoric correlations between items ranged from −0.28–
0.41, with average inter-item correlation at 0.08, suggesting there
is weak agreement between items, with many items negatively
related to one another (interestingly, relations between those
items that shared the same target word were also weak [Cautious;
r = 0.08; Fantasizing: r = 0.28; Preoccupied: r = 0.16]). The
average inter-item correlation, as well as the range of inter-item
1High School, GED equivalent, or Less than High School (n = 65, M = 26.54,
SD = 3.64); Some College (n = 159, M = 27.10, SD = 3.75); Associates Degree
(n = 54, M = 27.41, SD = 4.16); Bachelors Degree (n = 168, M = 27.61,
SD = 3.72); More than a Bachelors Degree (e.g., Masters, MD, JD, PhD) (n = 38,
M = 26.68, SD = 4.22).
2Females:M = 27.43, SD = 3.74; males:M = 26.98, SD = 3.89.
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correlations, are outside the range recommended by Clark and
Watson (1995) for sufficient internal consistency (recommended
values range from 0.15 to 0.50). This pattern of correlations
suggest that more than one factor might underlie the Eyes Test
(Piedmont and Hyland, 1993; see Figure 1 for the distribution of
correlations and Table A2 in Supplementary Materials for the full
correlation matrix).
Exploratory factor analysis
Because others have suggested there are multiple factors assessed
by the Eyes Test, and because many of the inter-item correlations
are negative, again suggesting more than one factor, we
performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to assess the
number of factors present in the data. Because the data are
dichotomous, we applied the estimator robust weighted least
squares means and variance adjusted (WLSMV; Muthén and
Muthén, 2011) on the raw data, which is most frequently used
with large sample sizes and dichotomous data (Flora and Curran,
2004; Beauducel and Herzberg, 2006); this method estimates
standard errors so we can apply significance testing to the overall
factor structure. A geomin (i.e., oblique) rotation was used so
that factors were allowed to correlate (however this does not
prevent an orthogonal structure from still being identified).
Beginning with a two-factor solution, we increased the number of
identifiable factors until, according to the model’s fit indices, the
structure showed adequate fit to the data (seeTable 1). According
to all fit indices the five-factor solution was the best fit to the
data. However, an examination of the factor pattern, identifying
items with moderate loadings or higher (>0.30), indicated that
only 27 of the 36 items moderately loaded on at least one
factor, with several items unrelated to any of the five factors
(Table 2). Also, the factors were either weakly or unrelated with
one another (see Table 3). Given that the Eyes Test is purported
to measure a single factor, and that none of these five factors was
previously postulated, we instead applied CFA to examine the
factor structure of the test.
Measurement model
The full version of the Eyes Test was modeled in CFA using
WLSMV. Since the authors of the Eyes Test propose that all items
are indicators of a single construct the test was modeled such that
each item loaded on a single latent variable (see Table 4). While
some might argue against using individual items as indicators
(e.g., Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994), and instead advocate for
parceling, a requirement for parceling is knowing the factor
structure supporting each item (Little et al., 2002). Since there is
no suggestion as how to create the parcels, that method was not
employed.
Model fit was evaluated according to established standards,
specifically RMSEA < 0.06, CFI ≥ 0.95, TLI ≥ 0.95 (Hu and
Bentler, 1999), and WRMR < 0.90 (Yu, 2002). Based on several
indicators model fit was poor [χ2
(594, n= 484)
= 707.03, p < 0.05;
RMSEA = 0.020(0.013–0.025); WRMR = 1.042; CFI = 0.728;
TLI = 0.711]. Specifically, the model fit of a single factor was not
TABLE 1 | Study 1: Exploratory factor analysis fit indices for the two to
five-factor solutions.
Chi-square RMSEA CFI TLI
2 Factors χ2(559) = 623.02, p < 0.05 0.015 (0.005–0.022) 0.846 0.826
3 Factors χ2(525) = 564.01, p = 0.12 0.012 (0.000–0.020) 0.906 0.887
4 Factors χ2(492) = 525.30, p = 0.14 0.012 (0.000–0.020) 0.920 0.897
5 Factors χ2(460) = 488.45, p = 0.17 0.011 (0.000–0.020) 0.931 0.906
FIGURE 1 | Study 1: Distribution of the tetrachoric correlations.
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TABLE 2 | Study 1: Exploratory factor analysis: five-factor solution with
rotated factor loadings of eyes test items.
Item Target Word Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
3 Desire 0.703 −0.026 0.066 −0.216 0.214
30 Flirtatious 0.500 0.038 −0.120 −0.087 −0.028
21 Fantasizing 0.419 −0.140 0.007 0.353 −0.003
6 Fantasizing 0.391 −0.005 −0.024 0.286 −0.200
25 Interested 0.358 0.318 −0.248 0.012 −0.054
34 Distrustful 0.317 −0.023 0.428 0.013 0.008
9 Preoccupied −0.042 0.640 −0.026 −0.039 −0.136
19 Tentative 0.007 0.509 0.246 −0.357 −0.026
14 Accusing −0.018 0.481 0.061 −0.010 0.099
36 Suspicious 0.170 0.443 −0.049 −0.346 0.181
8 Despondent −0.048 0.368 0.351 0.083 0.094
16 Thoughtful −0.166 0.329 0.128 0.081 −0.025
10 Cautious −0.004 −0.003 0.550 −0.046 −0.060
24 Pensive 0.127 0.171 0.450 0.004 −0.045
5 Worried 0.259 0.075 0.420 0.032 −0.318
7 Uneasy −0.057 −0.093 0.405 −0.052 0.139
4 Insisting −0.034 −0.111 0.326 −0.014 0.230
35 Nervous 0.222 0.024 0.321 −0.043 0.221
20 Friendly −0.054 0.144 0.067 0.436 −0.045
1 Playful 0.018 0.098 −0.076 0.339 0.156
23 Defiant −0.003 0.050 −0.015 −0.091 0.565
28 Interested −0.004 0.197 0.040 0.152 0.414
22 Preoccupied 0.050 0.174 −0.008 0.214 0.347
2 Upset 0.273 0.009 0.029 0.216 0.033
11 Regretful 0.268 0.032 0.135 0.098 0.146
12 Skeptical −0.144 0.264 0.168 −0.046 0.050
13 Anticipating 0.132 0.189 −0.130 0.110 0.133
15 Contemplative 0.008 0.296 0.211 0.066 0.082
17 Doubtful −0.257 0.006 0.166 0.025 0.230
18 Decisive 0.010 −0.034 0.221 0.233 0.254
26 Hostile 0.100 −0.032 0.124 0.076 0.024
27 Cautious 0.028 0.094 0.069 0.055 0.274
29 Reflective 0.145 0.177 −0.038 0.107 −0.008
31 Confident 0.125 0.134 0.027 0.112 −0.190
32 Serious 0.025 0.275 0.131 0.240 −0.020
33 Concerned −0.019 0.289 −0.048 0.272 0.119
In the above table, all loadings above 0.30 are bolded.
TABLE 3 | Study 1: Exploratory factor analysis inter-factor correlations for
the five-factor solution.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Factor 2 0.122
Factor 3 0.019 0.140
Factor 4 0.021 0.214* 0.105
Factor 5 0.025 0.146 0.233 −0.008
*p < 0.05.
acceptable according to the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic. However,
while χ2 is considered an important statistic for interpretation, it
is overly influenced by sample size and thus models can be easily
TABLE 4 | Study 1: confirmatory factor analysis results, including factor
loadings (β) and variance explained, for a 1-factor solution.
Item Target word Fully standardized
betas (β)
Indicator variance
explained
1 Playful 0.208* 0.043
2 Upset 0.197* 0.039
3 Desire 0.280* 0.078
4 Insisting 0.252* 0.064
5 Worried 0.253* 0.064
6 Fantasizing 0.086 0.007
7 Uneasy 0.249* 0.062
8 Despondent 0.560* 0.314
9 Preoccupied 0.326* 0.106
10 Cautious 0.310* 0.096
11 Regretful 0.307* 0.094
12 Skeptical 0.271* 0.073
13 Anticipating 0.190* 0.036
14 Accusing 0.418* 0.175
15 Contemplative 0.421* 0.177
16 Thoughtful 0.275* 0.076
17 Doubtful 0.164* 0.027
18 Decisive 0.338* 0.114
19 Tentative 0.367* 0.135
20 Friendly 0.242* 0.059
21 Fantasizing 0.152 0.023
22 Preoccupied 0.384* 0.147
23 Defiant 0.284* 0.081
24 Pensive 0.439* 0.193
25 Interested 0.127* 0.016
26 Hostile 0.133* 0.018
27 Cautious 0.289* 0.084
28 Interested 0.428* 0.183
29 Reflective 0.170* 0.029
30 Flirtatious 0.073 0.005
31 Confident 0.080 0.006
32 Serious 0.351* 0.123
33 Concerned 0.307* 0.094
34 Distrustful 0.371* 0.138
35 Nervous 0.406* 0.165
36 Suspicious 0.313* 0.098
*p < 0.05; Light shaded cells indicates a weak relation (β < 0.30), medium shaded cells
indicate a moderate relation (0.30 ≥ β < 0.50), and dark shaded cells indicate a strong
relation (β ≥ 0.50).
rejected. The absolute fit index RMSEA (Steiger and Lind, 1980),
which estimates the amount of misfit per degree of freedom
by adjusting the chi-square measure to account for degrees
of freedom, thus ceteris paribus simple models are preferred,
indicated good fit. However, the RMSEA will result in artificially
lower estimates when there are weak factor loadings (Heene et al.,
2011; Savalei, 2012), as is the case in this model, which can lead to
an acceptance of a larger saturated model (Rigdon, 1996). Finally,
model fit according to WRMR (Yu, 2002), and the relative or
incremental fit indices CFI (Bentler, 1990) and TLI (Tucker and
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Lewis, 1973), which are based on the percent of improvement
compared to the null model, model fit was poor (e.g., Kline,
2005).
A single factor was also a poor predictor of a majority of
the items. Twenty items (56% of the scale) had weak loadings
with the average loading at 0.278 (loadings ranged from 0.073
to 0.560). For all items there was more residual variance
(average = 0.910) than variance explained by the single factor
(average= 0.090), with the single factor not explainingmore than
31% of the variance for any item. These results are not surprising,
given the low inter-item correlations, and suggest that a single
factor solution for all 36 items is not a sufficient representative fit
to the data.
Omega
Next, based on the factor loadings in the CFA we estimated
ordinal omega (ω; equation 6.20 b in McDonald, 1999), which
is the traditional omega based on the tetrachoric correlation
matrix, and provides an estimate of factor saturation and internal
consistency. According to omega the factor saturation and
internal consistency of the scale is acceptable (ω = 0.75).
However, given that many of the items are unrelated to one
another, and in many instances, negatively related, this estimate
is most likely inflated because of the test’s length (Nunnally and
Bernstein, 1994; Zinbarg et al., 2006).
Convergent validity evidence
Convergent validity evidence was estimated in a CFA by
correlating the full Eyes Test, modeled as a latent variable
indicated by its 36 items, with a measure of Cognitive Empathy,
Emotion Perception, or Vocabulary, where each construct was
also modeled as a latent variable, indicated by either individual
items (Perspective Taking), parcels (Vocabulary), or emotion-
specific subscales (ESE Cognitive Empathy and the DANVA; see
Table 7). However, given the poor fit of the single factor solution
to the data in a CFA, the fit of these models is poor, thus the
correlations could not be meaningfully interpreted.
Conclusion
Overall, based on the presented results, we suggest that the
complete Eyes Test does not have a single factor solution. The
inter-item correlations are low, with many items unrelated to one
another, and in many instances, negatively related, suggesting
that the omega estimate may be inflated because of the test’s
length. Second, an EFA identified five factors, with these factors
weakly correlated with one another and many items not loading
on any factor. Finally, in a CFA a single factor solution did not
adequately fit the data, with large residual variances remaining for
a majority of the items. Overall, the test is not homogeneous. To
result in superior psychometric properties, the test would most
likely benefit from being reduced to a short-form solution with a
focus on the test’s homogeneity.
Revising the Eyes Test Structure
Next, we identified and tested several revised versions of the Eyes
Test with the goal of addressing the shortcomings identified in
the full version. The first set of models are based on structures
proposed in the literature, with the last two based on data driven
methods. The first model tested is a reduced 17-item version
proposed by Konrath et al. (2014). The next two models are
based on the valence of the target response options and identify
positive, negative, and in one case, neutral affect subscales.
The last set of models were identified through data driven
methods: (1) Maximizing Main Loadings, and (2) an adaptation
of the Ant Colony Optimization method (Marcoulides and
Drezner, 2003, adaptation by Olaru et al., in press). Each revised
version will be evaluated according to same criteria applied
above. In order to compare sample-level scores between the
revised scales, the Eyes Test items will be averaged instead of
summed.
Konrath Reduced Scale
Konrath et al. (2014) utilized a short-form measure of the Eyes
Test, including only 17 of the full 36 items, and reported the
internal consistency was poor (α = 0.23). Unfortunately, only
the target word of those itemswas reported, three of which appear
twice in the original scale. As mentioned earlier, those three items
are weakly correlated with one another, suggesting that in a CFA
two items with the same target word are not interchangeable.
As such, we iteratively tested all combinations of the repeated
items with CFA; results for the best set of items, according to
the CFA fit indices, are presented in Tables 4–6. In a CFA this
structure was an improved fit according to the CFA fit indices
when compared with the complete Eyes Test, however only five
of the 17 items had moderate or higher loadings on the single
factor, and five items were not even significantly related to the
central construct, suggesting that single factor did not adequately
account for the variance in the 17 items and this solution had
poor structural validity evidence. Similarly, the omega estimate
of this short-form structure was poor indicating poor factor
saturation and internal consistency. Finally, based on the latent
correlations, this short-form solution had weak to moderate
relations with Cognitive Empathy, moderate relations with
Emotion Perception, and was strongly related with Vocabulary.
Because this short-form solution has poor internal consistency
according to omega and had poor structural validity evidence,
this structure is not a sufficient solution.
Konrath Affect Model
Konrath et al. (2014) also proposed two subscales - (1) Positive
Affect; and (2) Negative Affect—with two of the 17 items
from the Konrath Reduced Scale Model not used on either
subscale. In a single CFA, we modeled both subscales as
two latent constructs indicated by their respective items and
correlating with one another. The model resulted in an improper
solution, with the predicted covariance matrix not positive
definite (this also occurred with the factors modeled separately)
suggesting this solution was not an adequate fit to the data. As
such, omega could not be estimated. Because these subscales
could not be modeled in a CFA, their latent correlations with
Cognitive Empathy, Vocabulary, and Emotion Perception were
not estimated. Overall, this subscale structure is not a sufficient
solution.
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TABLE 5 | Study 1 and 2: Comparison of possible short-form and subscale solutions.
Model Total number
of items
(Females)
Descriptive statistics Omega (ω) CFA—Fit indices
M SD Skew Kurtosis Chi-square RMSEA (CIs) WRMR CFI TLI
STUDY 1
Full Scale 36 (17) 0.76 0.11 −0.51 0.06 0.75 χ2(594) = 707.03, p < 0.05 0.020 (0.013–0.025) 1.042 0.728 0.711
Konrath Model
Reduced 17 (6) 0.77* 0.12 −0.64 0.17 0.58 χ2(119) = 126.15, p = 0.31 0.011 (0.000–0.026) 0.876 0.914 0.902
Positive 6 (2) 0.80* 0.17 −0.62 −0.16 na na
Negative 9 (3) 0.74 0.15 −0.47 −0.07 na na
Harkness Model
Negative affect 12 (5) 0.72 0.15 −0.33 −0.32 0.55
Positive affect 8 (5) 0.82 0.15 −0.66 0.01 0.48 χ2(591) = 694.77, p < 0.05 0.019 (0.012–0.025) 1.032 0.750 0.733
Neutral affect 16 (7) 0.75 0.14 −0.66 0.31 0.67
MML solution 7 (4) 0.69 0.22 −0.57 −0.13 0.64 χ2(14) = 21.18, p = 0.10 0.033 (0.000–0.059) 0.777 0.941 0.912
ACO model 10 (4) 0.81 0.17 −1.22 1.90 0.70 χ2(35) = 44.25, p = 0.14 0.023 (0.000–0.042) 0.826 0.937 0.918
STUDY 2
ACO Model 10 (4) 0.72 0.19 −0.89 1.09 0.73 χ2(35) = 34.85, p = 0.48 0.000 (0.000–0.049) 0.699 1.000 1.002
+
*Indicates there is a significant difference between the performance of male and female participants, with females performing better than males. na, statistic could not be estimated.
+, TLI can sometimes fall outside of the 0–1 range (Kline, 2005).
Harkness Model
Harkness et al. (2005) also identified three affect-based subscales:
(1) Positive Affect; (2) Negative Affect; and (3) Neutral Affect.
When modeled in a CFA, with the three subscales modeled as
latent factors indicated by their respective items and with the
factors correlated with one another, the test structure was a poor
fit to the data according to the fit indices, with many items
loading weakly on their respective latent factor (note: the poor
fit is also supported by (Vellante et al., 2012)). The interfactor
correlations were moderate (Negative Affect with Positive Affect:
r = 0.399, p < 0.05; Positive Affect with Neutral Affect: r =
0.490, p < 0.05), with the correlation between the Negative Affect
and Neutral Affect subscales strong (r = 0.876, p < 0.05),
suggesting the latter two subscales measure similar constructs.
The omega estimates were poor for all three subscales indicating
poor factor saturation and internal consistency. Finally, because
the measurement model was a poor fit to the data, the latent
correlations with Cognitive Empathy, Vocabulary, and Emotion
Perception were not estimated. Overall, these results suggest this
short-form structure is not a sufficient solution.
These results suggest that none of the empirically proposed
short-form or subscale structures adequately fit the data. Next,
we applied two statistical tools in a data-driven fashion to identify
the best fitting short-form structure according to that particular
statistical tool that maximize one or both of our criteria. In both
attempts, we are assuming that all items are equal indicators
of ToM.
Maximizing Main Loadings (MML) Solution
First, we used CFA to identify the maximum number of items
that could be identified by a single latent construct in a model
that had adequate fit according to chi-square, RMSEA, CFI, and
TLI. First, all 36 items were modeled in a single CFA, with all
items loading on a single factor. Then, the item with the weakest
loading was removed and the model was re-estimated for the
reduced item set; this was done iteratively until the model had
adequate fit according to all fit indices. This process resulted in
a much reduced model, retaining only seven of the original 36
items. This final model showed acceptable fit according to the
CFA fit indices, with all items moderately or strongly loading
on the latent factor. At the latent level, the MML Solution was
not significantly related to Cognitive Empathy, weakly related
to Emotion Perception, and moderately related to Vocabulary.
However, despite an adequate measurement model structure, this
short-form solution has a poor omega estimate indicating poor
internal consistency and factor saturation, so this short-form
solution was also not sufficient.
Ant Colony Optimization
ACO is a heuristic algorithm that converges to an optimal
or close-to-optimal solution over the course of iterations. The
criterion to be optimized can be specified freely, for example,
maximizing CFI, minimizing RMSEA, maximizing standardized
loadings, etc. Subsets of items are picked based on probabilities,
and these probabilities are then modified after each iteration
based on the suitability of each item to reach the specified
criterion. Assuming an item contributes to improving the
specified criterion, ACO will then increase the probability of
that item in the subsequent subset of items (Leite et al., 2008).
In a study comparing ACO with other methods to identify
a short-form solution, the ACO method was found to be
an efficient procedure that, when compared with the other
methods, identified a short-form solution with the best fitting
measurement model structure (modeled in a CFA), with the
highest internal consistency and factor saturation (assessed with
ω; Olaru et al., in press).
In line with the goals of this paper, ACO was specified to
identify the shortest short-form solution that maintained an
adequate omega estimate (ω = 0.70) and model fit in a
CFA (CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.02). A 10-item solution was
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TABLE 6 | Study 1 and 2: confirmatory factor analysis fully standardized loadings (β) for all short-form and subscale solutions.
No. Target Word Sex Study 1 Study 2
Konrath
model–reduced
Harkness model MML ACO model ACO model
Negative Positive Neutral
1 Playful M 0.155 0.393*
2 Upset M 0.227* 0.205*
3 Desire F 0.240* 0.305*
4 Insisting M 0.289* 0.244*
5 Worried M 0.173 0.273*
6 Fantasizing F 0.065 0.261*
7 Uneasy M 0.144 0.230*
8 Despondent M 0.678* 0.611* 0.545* 0.653* 0.616*
9 Preoccupied F 0.427* 0.482* 0.510*
10 Cautious M 0.318* 0.442*
11 Regretful M 0.255* 0.334*
12 Skeptical M 0.362* 0.297* 0.406* 0.669*
13 Anticipating M 0.225* 0.166*
14 Accusing M 0.428* 0.431* 0.476* 0.376*
15 Contemplative F 0.468* 0.450* 0.351* 0.437* 0.635*
16 Thoughtful M 0.210* 0.393*
17 Doubtful F 0.145 0.164*
18 Decisive F 0.355*
19 Tentative F 0.347* 0.411* 0.413* 0.139
20 Friendly M 0.424*
21 Fantasizing F 0.314*
22 Preoccupied F 0.327* 0.406* 0.353* 0.242*
23 Defiant M 0.308*
24 Pensive M 0.457* 0.482* 0.390* 0.451*
25 Interested F 0.249*
26 Hostile M 0.139
27 Cautious F 0.214* 0.297*
28 Interested F 0.448*
29 Reflective F 0.189*
30 Flirtatious F 0.150
31 Confident F 0.220*
32 Serious M 0.397* 0.393* 0.480*
33 Concerned M 0.349*
34 Distrustful F 0.400* 0.487*
35 Nervous F 0.444* 0.437*
36 Suspicious M 0.335* 0.316* 0.454*
*p < 0.05 Shaded cells indicate the item belongs to that particular subscale. Light shaded cells indicates a weak relation (β < 0.30), medium shaded cells indicate a moderate relation
(0.30 ≥ β < 0.50), and dark shaded cells indicate a strong relation (β ≥ 0.50).
identified as the shortest scale that matched both criteria (and
in an additional 100 runs of the ACO, the same 10 items were
identified over 90% of the time with deviating solutions of lesser
psychometric quality; please see (Olaru et al., in press), for details
on the procedure). In a CFA, all items loaded moderately to
strongly on the latent factor. The average inter-item correlation
(0.18) is acceptable according to Clark and Watson (1995),
however the range of inter-item correlations (−0.07 to 0.36)
still falls outside of their recommendations. At the latent level,
this short-form solution was weakly related to both measures
of Cognitive Empathy and moderately related to both Emotion
Perception and Vocabulary. Because the ACO Model has an
adequate omega estimate and adequate fit in a measurement
model, we suggest the ACO Model is a sufficient short-form
solution to the Eyes Test.
Conclusion
In contrast to the complete Eyes Test, the ACO Model has
adequate psychometric properties according to our criteria,
suggesting this is a sufficient short-form solution to the complete
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TABLE 7 | Study 1 and 2: correlations of the eyes test with the latent
constructs cognitive empathy, vocabulary, and emotion perception.
IRI
perspective
taking
ESE
cognitive
empathy
Emotion
perception
Vocabulary
STUDY 1
Original scale 0.11 0.21* 0.35* 0.54*
Konrath
model–reduced
0.16* 0.34* 0.38* 0.59*
MML solution 0.07 0.11 0.19* 0.46*
ACO model 0.15 0.21* 0.34* 0.49*
STUDY 2
ACO model 0.25* 0.56* 0.29* 0.62*
*p < 0.05; Light shaded cells indicates a weak relation (r < 0.30), medium shaded cells
indicate a moderate relation (0.30 ≥ r < 0.50), and dark shaded cells indicate a strong
relation (r ≥ 0.50).
Eyes Test. At the latent level, this solution was most related
to Vocabulary, followed by Emotion Perception and Cognitive
Empathy. Because the ACO solution might be somewhat
overfitted on the current sample, we cross-validated this solution
on a second sample.
Study 2
Methods
Participants
Participants were again sampled from AmazonMechanical Turk.
Initially, 233 persons participated, however after removing those
with insufficient variance in their responses, our final sample
was 210 persons (108 female), primarily White, non-Hispanic
(82%; 11% Black, non-Hispanic; 3%Asian; 4%Other), on average
39.9 years of age (SD = 22.4), from a variety of education
levels (9% High School or GED equivalent, 39% Some College,
52% Bachelor’s Degree or higher). All participants were currently
living in the USA (indicated by their IP addresses) and for 97%
their native language was English.
Measures and Procedure
We administered the same measures described in Study 1 (in
order to reduce the testing time, we administered only those
scales discussed in this paper) and the 10 ACO Model items
of the Eyes Test. The internal consistency of all measures was
acceptable: Perspective Taking (ω = 0.88); Emotion Specific
Empathy Cognitive Empathy (ω = 0.94); DANVA 2 (ω = 0.95);
Vocabulary (ω = 0.90).
Results
The ACO Model solution in Study 2 had an adequate omega
(ω = 0.73), indicating acceptable internal consistency and
factor saturation. The average inter-item correlation (0.20) was
acceptable according to Clark and Watson (1995), however the
range of inter-item correlations (-0.07 to 0.59) still falls outside
of their recommendation. The measurement model structure fit
the data sufficiently according to the CFA fit statistics, with eight
of the 10 items loading moderately to strongly on the latent
factor. To test for measurement invariance in the scale structure
between the two samples, we estimated amultiple-group analysis.
Because the data is categorical, we applied a two-step approach
recommended byMuthén andMuthén (2011). In the first model,
comparable to traditional constraints associated with configural
invariance, item thresholds and factor loadings were allowed to
vary freely across the samples, while the scale factors were fixed
at 1 and factor means were fixed at 0. Overall, this structure fit
the data well according to all fit indices, which the exception
of the WRMR [χ2(70) = 79.29, p = 0.21, RMSEA = 0.020
(0.000–0.038), WRMR = 1.082, CFI = 0.962, TLI = 0.951].
However, given that all fit indices, with the exception of the
WRMR, indicate acceptable fit, we can ignore the WRMR in this
instance (Muthén, 2014). Next, the item thresholds and factor
loadings were constrained to be equal across samples, while the
scale factors in Sample 1 were fixed to 1, the factor mean in
Sample 1 was fixed to 0, and in Sample 2 the scale factors and
factor mean was allowed to vary (considered similar to strong
factorial invariance). This model also fit the data well [χ2(79) =
85.31, p = 0.29, RMSEA = 0.015 (0.000–0.035), WRMR =
1.160, CFI = 0.974, TLI = 0.971] and the constraints did not
significantly decrease the fit of the model [1χ2(9) = 6.02, p =
0.74, estimated with the DIFFTEST option in MPlus] suggesting
that overall, the ACO Model has equivalent structure in
both samples.
At the latent level, the model was weakly to strongly related
with measures of Cognitive Empathy, weakly related with
Emotion Perception, and strongly related with Vocabulary. The
relations with Emotion Perception, Vocabulary, and Perspective
Taking were similar between Study 1 and Study 2, however
the relation with ESE Cognitive Empathy was considerably
higher. The change in relation could be due to differences
in the loadings of indicators on their respective measurement
models, difference in intercepts, and so forth, so the model was
remodeled in a multiple-group analysis comparing both samples.
Restrictions of configural invariance [χ2(206) = 226.78, p = 0.15,
RMSEA = 0.017 (0.000–0.029), WRMR = 1.014, CFI = 0.990,
TLI = 0.988] and strong factorial invariance [χ2(226) = 241.41,
p = 0.23, RMSEA = 0.014 (0.000–0.027), WRMR = 1.130,
CFI = 0.992, TLI = 0.992] fit the data well, and were not
significantly different from one another [1χ2(20) = 14.63,
p = 0.80].
To compare the latent correlation between the ACO Model
and ESE Cognitive Empathy, we needed to create Phantom
Variables, which control for differences in the latent variances
between the two samples (Little, 1997). When we constrained the
model so that the latent correlation between the two factors was
equal across samples, the model still fit the data well [χ2(227) =
264.04, p < 0.05, RMSEA = 0.022 (0.003–0.032), WRMR =
1.253, CFI = 0.982, TLI = 0.981]. Model fit was, however,
significantly worse [1χ2(1) = 22.63, p < 0.05]. Given that
the final constrained model had acceptable fit, we will interpret
the final constrained latent correlation (i.e., 0.460), as indicating
overall a moderate relation between the ACO Model and ESE
Cognitive Empathy.
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Conclusion
In a second sample, the ACO Model maintained an adequate
omega estimate, indicating sufficient internal consistency and
factor saturation, and demonstrable homogeneity. The model
maintained moderate relations with Emotion Perception and
strong relations with Vocabulary, and had weak to moderate
relations with Cognitive Empathy. Overall, the adequacy of the
ACOModel solution was supported in this second sample.
Discussion
Summary
We performed a psychometric test of the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test and found, as reported by others (e.g., Harkness
et al., 2010), that the complete test is not homogenous and has
poor internal consistency. In previous work, several empirically
derived short-form and subscale solutions were proposed. We
evaluated these proposals on three criteria: (1) omega estimate,
indicating internal consistency; (2) factor saturation; and (3)
measurement model fit. Using these criteria, we identified a
short-form solution (ACO Model) that meets both criteria.
The ACO Model was sufficiently cross-validated in a second
sample. At the latent level, the ACO Model is weakly to
moderately related with Cognitive Empathy, moderately related
with Emotion Perception, and has the strongest relation with
Vocabulary.
Based on the results presented in this series of studies, and
inferred from evidence by other groups also suggesting that the
full measure has poor psychometric quality, we recommend the
use of the 10-item ACO Model short-form solution instead of
the full Eyes Test. This recommendation applies to all uses with
unimpaired healthy adults where the goal is to assess individual
differences in ToM. If the population or measurement intention
changes, adequate evidence concerning the criteria we applied
should be presented.
This short-form solution is homogeneous with adequate
internal consistency suggesting it is a more precise measure of
ToM compared with the original form. The short-form solution
is considerably reduced from the complete Eyes Test, making
it much quicker to administer. Also, the descriptive statistics
suggest that the spread of person-level scores is comparable to
that of the complete Eyes Test, thus the short-form solution still
acts as an adequate individual difference measure.
Regarding the design, the ACO Model has an almost equal
distribution of male and female identities, like the original
version. Also, while it is possible that the ACO Model short-
form solution might be conceptually limited from Baron-Cohen
et al.’s (2001) original intentions, with an overuse of items
where the target item is neutral or negative (based on the affect
classification provided by Harkness et al., 2005), we argue that
this is not the case. First, Baron-Cohen and colleagues did
not discuss purposely including items with different affects and
they never proposed that the affect of the target word could
be used to create subscales or should bias performance on the
test, so in our analyses we operated under the assumption that
there was no preference in terms of which items were the
most appropriate for the measure of ToM. Also, as presented
above, we found that the affect classifications by Konrath et al.
(2014) and by Harkness et al. (2005) were a poor organization
of the items, suggesting that the affect of the target word does
not predict performance in any meaningful way. Thus, the
ACO short-form solution should not be considered to be a
measure of ToM that is biased toward assessing ToM of negative
mental states any more than that assumption is made of the
original test.
Convergent Validity Evidence
The moderate latent relations with Cognitive Empathy and
Emotion Perception were expected based on Baron-Cohen et al.
(2001) intentions and based on previous literature. ToM is
largely considered by some to be similar to, if not the same
as, Cognitive Empathy (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2004). That these
two were not more strongly correlated can be attributed to
the differences in measurement methodologies (Nunnally and
Bernstein, 1994). Likewise, the moderate relation with Emotion
Perception is also supported in the literature (e.g., Henry et al.,
2009). Both ToM and Emotion Perception tests are described
as ability tests and both test the extent to which participants
can read the minds, facial expressions, and feelings of another
person. Given these overlaps, it should be considered that
ToM, as measured with the Eyes Test, is part of a larger set
of research that includes Emotion Perception, referred to as
social intelligence, emotional intelligence, interpersonal abilities,
and/or socio-emotional abilities.
Finally, while a relation with Vocabulary was expected, we did
not expect such a strong relation. Previous research suggests that
at the manifest level, the Eyes Test is weakly related to verbal
fluency (Ahmed and Miller, 2011) and moderately related to
verbal IQ (Golan et al., 2006; Peterson and Miller, 2012). At the
latent level, however, we found a strong correlation (0.49 in Study
1 and 0.62 in Study 2) between the ACOModel with Vocabulary,
which is similar in magnitude to the manifest correlation with
Vocabulary found by Peterson and Miller (2012). That this is
the second study to identify such a strong relation between the
Eyes Test and Vocabulary suggests that performance on the
former may be heavily based on one’s vocabulary knowledge.
The response options of the Eyes Test, in general, occur less
frequently in the English language [e.g., the mean frequency of
the response options, based on the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (Davies, 2008), is 8556] compared with other
descriptive terms [e.g., the six based emotions (anger, disgust,
fear, happy, sad, surprise) where the mean frequency is 28,435].
In fact, based on our Study 1 data, the frequency of the target
word is weakly correlated (r = 0.10) with how often that response
option was selected by the participants meaning target words that
occur more frequently were more likely to be correctly chosen by
the participants. The test’s reliance on Vocabulary wasmentioned
by the test designers, however the inclusion of the response
option definitions in the instructions for the test was designed to
mitigate this effect. Our results, and that of others, suggests this
may not be sufficient. Future revisions of the Eyes Test should
focus on minimizing the test’s reliance on Vocabulary, so that the
test might be a more precise measure of ToM and less a measure
of Vocabulary.
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Conclusions
Overall, we were able to identify an adequate short-form
solution to the Eyes Test that is homogeneous and has adequate
internal consistency. That short-form solution was strongly
related to Vocabulary, moderately related to Emotion Perception,
and moderately to weakly related with self-reported Cognitive
Empathy. Given the relatively high relation with Emotion
Perception, and other research that consistently identifies the
Eyes Test as related to Emotion Perception, and sometimes a
measure of that construct, future research should attempt to
incorporate ToM research, in particular the Eyes Test, in research
on emotional intelligence and interpersonal abilities with the
goal of identifying the convergent and discriminant validity of
this test amongst these abilities. Finally, the strong relation with
Vocabulary suggests that the Eyes Test still has a large reliance
on one’s vocabulary, and future revisions of the test should try to
reduce that bias.
The relations of the Eyes Test with Emotion Perception
and Vocabulary is of particular importance for the study
of clinical populations identified to have a deficit in ToM.
Given that the Eyes Test correlates moderately with Emotion
Perception and strongly with Vocabulary, as the Eyes Test
is designed currently one cannot rule out the possibility that
perhaps the Eyes Test discriminates between these groups on
Emotion Perception and Vocabulary, and not just on ToM.
Research regarding the extent to which individuals on the Autism
Spectrum have a deficit in their ability to perceive emotions in
the face (cf. Harms et al., 2010) and a deficit in language ability
(cf. Bosseler and Massaro, 2003) is mixed, however findings
generally point to a deficit in both. Thus, the differences in
groups identified by the Eyes Test might be because the test
identifies differences between these groups in their Vocabulary
and Emotion Perception abilities. This should be examined in
future research.
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